Abstract
Introduction
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) is an automatic technology to identify objects embedded with RFID tags by wireless scanning. A typical RFID system is composed of a server, readers, and tags. Mobile readers that combining mobile technology with traditional RFID systems [1] [2] [3] are used more and more widespread, it brings higher design requirements for RFID security protocols.
Figure 1. Wireless connection environment
Special physical character and strictly limited resources in tags make RFID systems being confronted with many security problems. Recently, many RFID authentication protocols have been proposed providing solutions to RFID security problems, however, in the most of them, the server must perform a linear search of its database to identify and authenticate a tag. Namely for each tag entry in the database in turn, it computes the lightweight cryptographic function that would be produced by that tag and compares it with the received authentication application. Such a linear search runs in O(n) time, where n is the number of tags. Such a costly search function will potentially cause scalability issues as the tag population increases [5] . So designing an efficient and low-cost security scheme for RFID systems becomes a challenging research object [4] .
The main contribution of this paper is to propose a lightweight RFID authentication protocol for mobile reader which only requires O(1) work (lightweight encryption calculation) to identify and authenticate a tag in the server and is suitable for the low-cost RFID systems.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: in the second section, the related work is introduced; in the third section, a new lightweight RFID authentication protocol for mobile reader is proposed; in the fourth section, security properties and performance of the proposed protocol are analyzed; finally, the conclusion of this paper is generalized in the fifth section.
Related work
Many hash-based RFID authentication protocols have been proposed recently [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] . Let's introduce and analyze the proposed protocol [10] as follows: Step3: After receiving N T and H(S⊕N R ⊕N T ) from the tag, the reader calculates H(RID⊕N R ), and sends N T , H(S⊕N R ⊕N T ), N R , H(RID⊕N R ) to the server.
Step4: After receiving authentication message from the reader, the server compares whether N R matches with N R(old) , if they match, the authentication is failed. If they don't match, the server would search whether there exists certain RID* in table RID of the database, which could make H(RID*⊕N R ) = H(RID⊕N R ). If there exists such record, the authentication application would be considered from a legitimate reader, or authentication is failed. Subsequently, the server would search whether there exists certain S new * in table ID of the database, which could make H(S new *⊕N R ⊕N T ) = H(S⊕N R ⊕N T ). If there exists such record, the tag would be considered as a legitimate tag, then the server generates a random number N DB and calculates H(ID N DB ), then sends N DB , H(ID N DB ) to the reader, subsequently the server should update S old = S new , S new = H(ID N DB N T ), N R(old) = R R(new) and R R(new) = N R . If there not exists such record, which could make H(S new *⊕N R ⊕N T ) = H(S⊕N R ⊕N T ), the server should search whether there exists certain S old * in table ID of the database, which could make H(S old *⊕N R ⊕N T ) = H(S⊕N R ⊕N T ), if there exists such record, the tag would be considered as a legitimate tag, but in the last authentication access, the tag has not updated its S successfully for some reason, so the server generates a random number N DB and calculates H(ID⊕N DB ), then sends N DB , H(ID⊕N DB ) to the reader, subsequently the server should update S new = H(ID⊕N DB ⊕N T ), N R(old) = R R(new) , R R(new) = N R , but S old would keep unaltered. If there not exists such record which could make H(S old *⊕N R ⊕N T ) = H(S⊕N R ⊕N T ), the tag would be considered as an illegitimate tag, the authentication is failed, failure information would be sent to the reader.
Step5: After receiving N DB , H(ID⊕N DB ) from the server, the reader would send N DB , H(ID⊕N DB ) to the tag. After receiving N DB , H(ID⊕N DB ) from the reader, the tag would calculate H(ID⊕N DB ), If outcome equals to received H(ID⊕N DB ), then the object of mutual authentication achieves, the tag should update S = H(ID⊕N DB ⊕N T ), otherwise, the authentication is failed.
This protocol is a mutual RFID authentication protocol for mobile reader, its remarkable character is only using lightweight encryption calculation instead of traditional symmetry encryption method between the server and a reader. However, there are some shortcomings of security and performance as follows:
(1)In step4, the server would search whether there exists certain RID* in table RID of the database, which could make H(RID*⊕N R ) = H(RID⊕N R ), the server must perform the exhaustive linear search (record-by-record hash function calculation) to find the matching RID*. In each authentication access, the server averagely performs (m+1)/2 times hash operations to verify and authenticate a reader. Such a linear search runs in O(m) time, where m is the number of readers. Particularly, the server would search whether there exists certain S* in table ID which could make H(S new *⊕N R ⊕N T ) = H(S⊕N R ⊕N T ), and maybe search whether there exists certain S* in table ID which could make H(S old *⊕N R ⊕N T ) = H(S⊕N R ⊕N T ), the server must perform the exhaustive linear search (record-byrecord hash function calculation) to find the matching ID*. In each authentication access, the server averagely performs (n+1)/2 times hash operations to verify and authenticate a tag. Such a linear search runs in O(n) time, where n is the number of tags. Such a costly search function would potentially cause scalability issues as the amount of tags increases enormously.
(2)Because this protocol is based on pseudonym scheme, so the pseudonym of each tag should be uniquely. In the process of generating new S new in the server, this protocol does not check new S new whether equals to some value in column 'S new ' and column 'S old '. If the value has existed in column 'S new ' or column 'S old ', new S new being stored in the database without checking would lead to intending confusion.
(3)RFID reader cannot acquire ID information in this protocol, in step4, a reader receives H(ID‖N DB ) from the server, as we know, H() is a one-way hash function, so the reader cannot acquire ID information by decrypting H(ID‖N DB ), while it only knows whether a tag pass through authentication or not. However, ID information is important and necessary information for RFID reader.
(4)In step4, the server would calculate H(ID‖N DB ), and forward it to the tag through the reader. In the message H(ID‖N DB ), N DB has lost the relation with N R and N T , it would lead to some problems as follow:
.N DB loses the relation with N R and N T , if an adversary acquires message H(ID‖N DB ), N DB in step4 or step5 in an authentication access of a tag, the adversary could use this message to cheat the tag, the adversary could generate a random number N R ' and query tags with N R ' through the forward channel and replay H(ID‖N DB ), N DB to the tag later, the tag would believe that it has pass the authentication from the server.
.It leads to this protocol cannot resist tag impersonation. N DB loses the relation with N R and N T , an adversary could use acquired message H(ID‖N DB ), N DB to perform tag impersonation, the reader generates a random number N R and queries tags with N R through the forward channel, the adversary could replay H(ID‖N DB ), N DB to the reader in step4 later, the reader would believe that the tag has pass the authentication from the server but the genuine tag may be out already.
.More seriously, an adversary could use acquired message H(ID‖N DB ), N DB from a tag to perform Denial of Service (DoS) attack as follows: the adversary generates a random number N R ' and queries the tag with N R ', the tag would generate a random number N T ' and calculate H(S⊕N R '⊕N T '), and send N T ', H(S⊕N R '⊕N T ') back, the adversary could use H(ID‖N DB ), N DB to cheat the tag, the tag would update S = H(ID⊕N DB ⊕N T ') while genuine server has not update S new corresponding to this tag, so the tag would not be recognized by the genuine server again, that is to say, the genuine server and the tag lose synchronization after such attack.
.Though up to now, there is not multiple protocols environment for a tag, but in the future application, there maybe emerge the condition that a tag is not only authenticated by one server. If the tag is in multiple protocols authentication environment, returned message without the relation with reader(N R ) and tag(N T ), it would lead to confusion.
Based on this protocol, we proposed a revised RFID security protocol for mobile reader as follows.
A new lightweight RFID authentication protocol for mobile reader 3.1 Assumptions
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(1)The channel between the server and a reader is assumed insecure for wireless connection, and the channel between a reader and a tag is assumed insecure either, we assume that an adversary could observe and manipulate communications between insecure channels.
(2)A tag is not vulnerable to compromised with an adversary, namely an adversary cannot acquire the inner information of the tag easily; H() is secure enough against brute exhaustive search from an adversary. Step4: After receiving authentication message from the reader, the server compares whether N R matches with N R(old) , if they match, the authentication is failed. If they don't match, the server would calculate RID' = H(N R ‖N T )⊕(H(N R ‖N T )⊕RID) and search whether there exists certain RID* in table RID of the database, which could make RID' = RID*. If there exists such record, the authentication application would be considered from a legitimate reader, or authentication is failed. Subsequently, the server would calculate S' = H(N R ⊕N T )⊕(H(N R ⊕N T )⊕S) and search whether there exists certain S new * in table ID of the database, which could make S' = S new *. If there exists such record, the tag would be considered as a legitimate tag, then the server would generate a random number N DB that could make the value which equals to H(ID⊕N R ⊕N T ⊕N DB ) could not be found in column 'S old ' and column 'S new ', and calculate H(N R ⊕N T ⊕N DB )⊕ID, then send N DB , H(N R ⊕N T ⊕N DB )⊕ID to the reader, subsequently the server should update S old = S new , S new = H(ID⊕N R ⊕N T ⊕N DB ), N R(old) = R R(new) and R R(new) = N R . If there not exists such record which could make S' = S new *, the server should search whether there exists certain S old * in table ID of the database, which could make S' = S new *, if there exists such record, the tag would be considered as a legitimate tag, but in the last authentication access, the tag has not updated its S successfully for some reason, so the server should generate a random number N DB that could make the value which equals to H(ID⊕N R ⊕N T ⊕N DB ) could not be found in column 'S old ' and column 'S new ', and calculate H(N R ⊕N T ⊕N DB )⊕ID, then send N DB , H(N R ⊕N T ⊕ A Lightweight RFID Authentication Protocol for Mobile Reader He Jialiang, Ouyang Dantong, Bai Tian, Zhang Liming N DB )⊕ID to the reader, subsequently the server should update S new = H(ID⊕N R ⊕N T ⊕N DB ), N R(old) = R R(new) and R R(new) = N R , but S old would keep unaltered. If there not exists such record which could make S' = S new *, the tag would be considered as an illegitimate tag, the authentication is failed, failure information would be sent to the reader. Comparing with the proposed protocol [10] , revised protocol upswings as follow: (1)In step4, the server only needs one time hash operation and performs a constant time search to find the match item in RID table to verify and authenticate a reader, and one time hash operation (maybe two times hash operations) and performs a constant time search to find the match item in ID table to verify and authenticate a tag, so the time complexity of hash function calculation in the server achieves O(1).
The (i +1)th authentication access
(2)In step4, the server must check new pseudonym whether exists in column 'S old ' and column 'S now ' or not, if new pseudonym has existed in column 'S old ' or column 'S new ', the server should generate a new N DB until H(ID⊕N R ⊕N T ⊕N DB ) could not be found in column 'S old ' and column 'S new ' so as to guarantee new pseudonym is uniquely.
(3)In step4, revised protocol uses H(N R ⊕N T ⊕N DB )⊕ID to substitute H(ID‖N DB ). In the message H(N R ⊕N T ⊕N DB )⊕ID, N DB constructs the relation with N R and N T , it would solve the problems that have been brought forward above.
Analysis
Security analysis
We analyze this protocol to evaluate whether it satisfies the security requirements as follows: (1)Tag untraceability An adversary could eavesdrop the response message H(N R ⊕N T )⊕S, M L from a tag, and analyze the information carefully and try to detect the user location privacy by tracking the tag. Because the tag generates a new random number N T during each authentication access, so the adversary cannot determine which tag does the response from the message H(N R ⊕N T )⊕S, M L . So this protocol can meet tag untraceability.
(2)Tag information protection ID is stored in the server only and is transmitted from the server to tag through reader, in the transmission process, ID is shield by H(N R ⊕N T ⊕N DB ), an adversary cannot calculate H(N R ⊕N T ⊕ N DB ) so as to cannot acquire ID, so this protocol can meet tag information protection.
(3)Spoofing attack An adversary feigns a legitimate reader that sends a query with N R to tags through the forward channel, and obtains the response of a tag H(N R ⊕N T )⊕S, M L . In the next authentication access, when a legitimate reader sends query with N R ', the adversary feigns the tag and responds the legitimate reader with the obtained message H(N R ⊕N T )⊕S, M L through the backward channel. However, the reader generates a new random number during each authentication access, that is to say, N R ≠ N R ', so the adversary cannot perform tag impersonation.
(4)Replay attack Replay attack can be prevented in this protocol due to the message transmitted for each session is different. Different value of H(N R ⊕N T ) is utilized in individual session and N T that generated in a tag plays a key role in providing different value of H(N R ⊕N T ) to conceal pseudonym S of the tag. An adversary cannot hold H() and then acquire H(N R ⊕N T ), so it is impossible for an adversary to apply replay attack.
(5)Denial of Service (DoS) attack As pseudonym of a tag (S) is mutative, even if loss of message, power failure or loss of connection with the server happens during an authentication access, it would lead to dy-synchronization between the server and the tag, but this protocol could solve this problem in the next authentication access by searching pseudonym S in column 'S old ' and continuing the authentication access. So this protocol can shield DoS attack well.
(6)Forward security. Both the server and the tag store the secret value S, and update them in each authentication session. So forward security attacks would be failed because S has no relationship with previous sessions.
(7)Backward security. Both the server and the tag store the secret value S, N DB plays a role key in generating new S, an adversary cannot acquire next N DB of the server and forecast the behavior of the tag in the intending authentication access.
Performance evaluations
We make performance evaluations of this protocol as follows: Storage cost: a tag only stores ID, pseudonym S in its memory. So this protocol can meet the storage constraints in a low-cost RFID environment.
Computational cost: in RFID systems, the main limits of the computational ability lie on the tags. In this protocol, only hash operation, PRNG operation, and XOR calculation are used in tags.
Traffic cost: this protocol needs five rounds to perform an authentication access, the volume of exchanged message between a reader and a tag only needs 2(l+l r ), so efficiency of the transmission and communication cost has been economized well.
Server workload: in the server, only one hash operation is needed for verifying and authenticating a reader, no more than two times hash operations are needed for verifying and authenticating a tag, the server performs a constant time search to find the match item in its database, it would alleviate workload of the server sharply, so this protocol has well scalability and is very suitable to managing large population of tags.
Conclusion
In this paper, a new lightweight RFID mutual authentication protocol for mobile reader is proposed, this protocol only requires O(1) work to identify and authenticate a tag in the server, it would alleviate workload of the server sharply, so this protocol has well scalability and is very suitable to managing large population of tags. The careful security analysis shows that this protocol can resist spoofing attack, replay attack, DoS attack, and meet tag untraceability, tag information protection, forward security and backward security. 
